



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 20

Italy's Elections and France's Impact

by Jane P. C. Carey and
Andrew G. Carey

ROME—A battle of handbills floating down from the sky and from passing cars in the campaign for the Italian elections to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies on May 25 and 26, 1958 took the place of the battle of posters plastered inches thick on even the most ancient palace in the preceding parliamentary elections held five years ago. Political advertisements, now restricted by law to specially erected billboards or banners strung high across the streets, urged the electorate to "Vote Christian Democrat," "Vote Communist" or vote any one of the many parties contending for seats. Thousands of political meetings filled the squares with political oratory but aroused little real interest. The crisis in France knocked the campaign off the front pages of the newspapers for some days before the elections and left so deep an impression on voters of various political faiths as to affect the outcome of the poll.

The election days brought a vast turnout. Not only had thousands of Italians from other countries returned home to vote, but almost the entire electorate—93.7 percent—expressed their opinion at the polls. The Christian Democrats, the mass Catholic party of the

Center, rose slightly in strength; the Communists, losing in the North and gaining slightly in the South, managed to emerge with a tenth of one percent gain; the Left-wing Socialists gained more than the Communists; the minor parties failed to make the comeback which had been predicted. All in all, the significance of the changes lay not in the numbers involved but in their relationship to the trends of Italian politics.

Before the French crisis, the chief issues in the electoral campaign had been those of Church versus State, government intervention in economic affairs, and the perennial question of communism versus democracy. Many Italians, Catholics though they are, profoundly resent Church attempts to dominate the state through the Christian Democratic party and its allied organizations.

An appeal from the College of Bishops early in May to vote for the Christian Democrats convinced many people that the Church had gone too far. The fear of Church interference was clearly illustrated in the left-wing, anti-Communist weekly, *Espresso*, which a week before the elections printed a map of Italy covered by flying-saucers of priests' hats.

JULY 1, 1958

The issue of *statalismo*, or intervention by the government in economic affairs, was raised by fear of the growing power of the government-controlled gas and oil industry under Enrico Mattei, which produces everything from natural gas to synthetic rubber and atomic power and stretches its operations into Africa and the Middle East, and by IRI, the great state holding company with interests in vast sections of the Italian economy from the manufacture of steel and ships to chocolates. Under the able leadership of Giovanni Malagodi, a Liberal deputy, and with financial backing from *Confindustria*, the Italian version of the National Association of Manufacturers, the Liberal party fought the increase in state economic activity by a campaign based on so uncompromising an advocacy of unrestricted *laissez-faire* as to move the party from the Center to the Right.

Nenni Strengthened

The fear of communism had declined in Italy since the elections of 1948 and 1953, and the prosperity of the country plus the impact of the Hungarian revolt had caused the Communist party to lose members. The party's long-time leader, Palmiro Togliatti, is seriously ill and the leadership is now divided among competing forces. As a result, many observers had predicted a loss at the polls for the Communists, but this failed to occur and the party slightly more than held its own, with a vote of 6,700,000 for the Chamber of Deputies.

The Left-wing Socialists under Pietro Nenni fought a campaign without saying "yes" and without saying "no" to communism. Bolstered by successes in the 1956 local elections, the Left-wing Socialists refused to join in a so-called "popular front" with the Communists, fought them throughout the campaign, but nevertheless kept an eye to windward by refusing to make a complete break with them. Their election gains were notable, for Nenni's party continues to attract sympathizers with the Left who do not want to be tied to Moscow's apronstrings.

The Right, composed of two competing Monarchist parties and the neo-Fascists, lost heavily, despite the flamboyant campaign of Achille Lauro, leader of one of the Monarchist parties. Wealthy shipowner and mayor of Naples until he was forced to resign last year for having run the city heavily into debt, Lauro did not win the Senate seat he coveted, and in his old stronghold of Naples alone his party garnered some 100,000 votes less than in 1953.

The Christian Democrats did better than any other party, for they secured 42.2 percent of the total vote as compared to 40 percent in the preceding election. The result was achieved partly because of the organization built up by Amintore Fanfani, party secretary, in every city and mountain village, and of the work of many Christian Democratic ancillary organizations such as agriculturalists and trade unionists.

The French situation had a marked effect on the total election picture.

Fearing the growth of fascism in France, many people turned to the Communists or Left-wing Socialists as the parties which at least opposed fascism most strongly. Other voters abandoned their anti-clericalism and the minor lay parties, and voted for the Christian Democrats, as did many who opposed Christian Democratic reform programs and who might otherwise have voted for the Right.

In a total of 596 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 299 are necessary for a majority and of these the Christian Democrats hold 273. What kind of government will be formed after Parliament convenes on June 12? The most likely possibility is a Center-Left majority of Christian Democrats, Republicans and Social Democrats.

If the Center-Left path is the one chosen, the Left-wing Socialists of Nenni still remain a fundamental factor in the situation. If any way is found for their reunification with the Social Democrats, together they would provide a powerful ally of the Center. The relations of the Nenni Socialists with the Communists remain the key question, as they have for some time in the past, but in any case the newly added strength of the Socialists gives enhanced importance to their future actions.

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Limited War or Global War?

There is a lot of talk here these days about limited versus global war, a lot of argument whether the United States should prepare to fight one kind or the other.

This debate, however, misses the point. The decision the United States has to make is not whether it should prepare to fight regional, limited, brushfire wars or make its plans to fight only a global nuclear war. It is not a choice of either-or. The choice comes in military planning. Plans must be made to fight both kinds of wars. The questions to be decided are: does one kind of war get precedence over the other in planning, and if so by how much? The pulling and hauling over these issues in the Pentagon is not only over how to cut up the defense budget pie among the military services, but how much money should be spent on preparing to fight global nuclear wars and how much can be spared for preparing for brushfire wars.

Views of Services

Of the three services the Air Force is obviously the strongest advocate of global war preparation. For it is the big bombers of the Strategic Air Force which, in case of nuclear attack, would retaliate with overwhelming power in a global war. This does not mean that the other two services would not be involved in a global war too. Obviously they would. But the other two services, and particularly the Army, along with the Marines, must be relied on to fight the local wars—although in this case, too, the Air Force has a role to play.

The Pentagon's problem is how to prepare adequately for both an all-out global war and for a brushfire

emergency—and yet not bankrupt the nation. For the fact is that not only are weapons becoming more and more complicated, but they are becoming more and more costly. The result is that the United States is finding it literally cannot afford to be fully prepared separately for both kinds of wars. The government, therefore, has to balance the various needs of these two kinds of military operations against each other and decide on some system of priorities.

There was a time some years ago when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, under his doctrine of instant "massive retaliation," appeared to assume that all of our future wars would be big ones. But that doctrine is now being replaced by one that suggests all our future wars may be small ones. The argument is that with ICBM's, rockets, nuclear warheads, dirty bombs, and guided missiles a global war is too frightful to consider, or to start. Therefore, so the argument continues, limited wars are the only real threat in the future; and it is small wars we should prepare for.

This line of reasoning, however, overlooks the fact that it is only because the West is pressing forward to match the U.S.S.R. in global armaments, in rockets and ICBM's, that logic rules out an all-out attack by the Kremlin. In other words, only because the United States is ready for a global war will there be no global war. It is necessary to be ready for a general war to make sure we shall only have to fight a limited war.

Obviously it is a matter of judgment as to just what proportion of defense funds should go for global war weapons and what proportion

for limited war weapons. If there had to be a decision—for which there is no need—whether to prepare for a global war or a local war, the decision would have to be on the global side. For a number of local wars can be lost without losing everything; but a global war can be lost only once.

There is always the danger, also, that a local war may become global. The temptation for a potential loser in a local war is always to enlarge it—to turn the tide by using weapons or strategy that would make the conflict total. The alternative is to accept defeat. Because of this almost unacceptable choice, there is a tendency for local wars to end in stalemates. Korea and Indochina are good examples of this. Neither side won everything; but then neither side lost everything.

What Priorities?

What this all boils down to is that the United States must be ready to fight both limited wars and a global war. It can use some of its global weapons and troops in local wars, but not enough to endanger the retaliatory effectiveness of its global strategy. And, of course, its local war facilities would automatically be thrown into a global war.

It is not necessary, feasible or financially possible to maintain two separate military fighting forces—a global war force, and a local war military establishment. But it is necessary, possible and financially bearable to mesh these two military needs. The present problem is how to mesh them with the greatest effectiveness and the least cost, and in the right order of priorities.

NEAL STANFORD



France and the Future of Europe

Now that General Charles de Gaulle has assumed leadership of France in time of peace, as he had done 18 years ago in time of war, some observers wonder whether the French, as on many previous occasions in their colorful history, will set the tone for Europe. Such milestones as Louis XIV's concept of the monarchist state, *L'état c'est moi*; the French Revolution, sparked by the rise of the bourgeoisie; the slogan *Liberté, égalité, fraternité*, which a self-made monarch, Napoleon, carried across the continent to the gates of Moscow; the *mission civilisatrice*, a more inspiring term for "the white man's burden," which France believed it was performing in Asia, the Middle East and Africa—these and many other events left a profound imprint on European minds and policies.

In 1789 the French Revolution, with the stirring strains of the Marseillaise and the horrors of the guillotine, was as shocking to contemporaries, as subversive of the established order, as the Russian revolution in our times. And one of the features which particularly impresses foreigners about France today is that, in spite of technological change and industrialization, the country has not yet completed its political revolution, which remained a living issue under the Third and Fourth Republics. Will France change now, and with it Europe, in which it remains an influential factor in spite of the disasters of two world wars and of colonial setbacks in Indochina, Syria, Lebanon and, most recently, North Africa?

The slow-moving yet inexorable readjustment of forces within France during the postwar decade, climaxed

by the return of de Gaulle, has already revealed three important trends.

First, the political struggle in the National Assembly, which brought to power 25 governments since 1945 and has been frequently blamed on weaknesses in the constitution of the Fourth Republic, may turn out to be due to other, more deep-seated and more widespread causes which a reform of the governmental structure, as proposed by the new Premier, may not necessarily remove. The question may well be asked whether the political party system, hitherto regarded as an essential feature of democracy, is ill-adapted to the problems of industrial communities in the modern age when there are more than two parties of relatively equal strength.

Will Political Parties Change?

This question had already been raised in Italy by Mussolini. His answer was the corporative state, with a legislature whose members were to be spokesmen for various occupations and economic interests under an executive with authoritarian powers. The iniquities of fascism and later of German nazism, both at home and abroad, beclouded discussion of the merits and demerits of a corporative state. Yet few students of recent events in France can avoid two conclusions: first, that the economic interests of the one million French *colons* in Algeria had increasingly come to dominate the views of politicians in the National Assembly who were supposed to have been elected to represent and safeguard the interests of the French people as a whole; and, second, that the representatives of the people, grouped in many political parties, had become increas-

ingly incapable of reaching decisions on matters of vital concern to the nation.

It has also become clear that unless the Communists are included in parliamentary governments — as they were in de Gaulle's postwar cabinet — their presence as a strongly organized bloc which has commanded some 150 votes out of 596 prevents continuance of the movement *toujours à la gauche* (always to the left) which had previously given fluidity to France's political life. In the past, as leftist parties became more moderate, some of their members formed new groups of the Left. Now moderate reform parties like the Socialists tend to move toward the Center, or even the Right. Under these circumstances a conservative like de Gaulle, as long as he has a free hand, could be more flexible and liberal-minded than a Socialist like Guy Mollet, who actually followed a more rigid policy toward Algeria than the present Finance Minister Antoine Pinay, an independent, when Pinay was Foreign Minister. And meanwhile in Algeria the *colons* indicated their frustration with and contempt for what they call "the system" of political parties in Paris when they decided, at the height of their rebellion against the Gaillard and Pflimlin governments, to relinquish party ties altogether.

Today France, at least for the six months of special powers requested and received by de Gaulle, has a government of men, not of parties—of technicians in special fields rather than what we would call politicians. What will France do after the referendum which de Gaulle has promised on a new constitution in three

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What Arab Mergers Mean

by John S. Badeau

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It is too early to predict whether the creation of the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and the Arab Federation (Iraq-Jordan) will prove to be steps toward enduring Arab unity. Neither has been in existence long enough to determine whether each is only a trial marriage that may break up, or the founding of a family that will endure and multiply. And after a few days of mutual esteem, the new states lapsed into the old struggle between pro-Western Iraq and neutralist Egypt for leadership in the Arab world. At that time Fadhil al-Jamali, then Foreign Minister of Iraq, scornfully referred to "Abdel Nasser's annexation of Syria," while the strident voice of Radio Cairo labeled the Arab Federation a "tool of Western interests."

Advantages of Unity

Despite the uncertain future these mergers have implications significant for the Middle East and the Western world. The most obvious is that two unstable states have been saved from disastrous collapse. Syria was moving rapidly toward becoming Russia's first satellite in the Middle East. Beset with party strife, increasingly penetrated in the army and defense ministry by those who saw in Russia the wave of the future, and facing a national election in August in which the pro-Communists would probably control "the street" through students and city mobs, the days of neutral and independent Syria seemed numbered.

It was this threat that led the more genuinely nationalist elements of

Syria to seek salvation in the bosom of Egypt. Although Egypt is bound to the Soviet bloc by growing trade and economic assistance, President Nasser has consistently maintained a strong, internal anti-Communist policy. And Egypt's potential influence in the Arab world is so great that Russia has been loath to risk its gain by pressing for Communist, as distinct from Russian, influence in that country. The Syrian hopes of salvation have thus far been justified; under Nasser, the reputedly pro-Soviet deputy prime minister, minister of defense and chief of staff have been dropped and all political parties abolished—including the Communist.

Jordan had also been living precariously. Although King Hussein of Jordan was rescued from disaster little more than a year ago, his throne and the government that supports it have continued to remain in peril. It is doubtful that Hashemite Jordan could have long survived, without a viable economy, flooded with embittered Palestinian refugees and made the target of Syrian-Egyptian pressure. No Western power could have permanently shored up the present government without coming perilously close to some form of occupation—and in the Middle East today Western occupation is the kiss of death. But through union with Iraq, Jordan has allied itself with one of the economically strongest states of the Arab world led by a determined pro-Western government, and reduced the potential influence of its restless Palestinian citizens. In its future problems Jordan will now have

a competent Arab partner to share the burden.

Both these developments, then, are to the good. Neither the welfare of the Middle East nor the interest of the West would be served by a satellite Syria or a dismembered Jordan. The first would give the Soviet Union what it has thus far failed to gain—a political beachhead in the Arab world; the second could only lead to a scramble for territory that might precipitate a new war between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

What Will Be 'Arab Nation'?

However, a second implication of the mergers is that a new element of instability has been added to the Middle East. Like virtue, Arab unity is the one cause against which no one in the area could raise serious objections. But so long as that unity was principally a verbal ideal, orated about but not acted upon, its political implications were negligible. Now Arab unity has come down from the clouds to be embodied in concrete political form. Like the division of the international world between Russia and the West, the emergence of two Arab unions brings pressure to bear on the rest of the Arab states to choose sides. Neutralism between the rival claimants is difficult, for it leaves hesitant governments open to the accusation of being uncommitted to the Arab cause.

The choice to be made is not simply between Egyptian and Iraqi leadership. The United Arab Republic and the Arab Federation embody contrasting approaches to the

ultimate form the "Arab nation" may take. The AF is a federal union, with the two constituent countries retaining their own national identity, constitution, parliament and government. This is the first step toward evolving a "United States of the Arab World" which has attracted many Arab leaders in recent years. The basis of union in the UAR is different. Here Egypt and Syria gave up their national identity and political life to merge into a new state. This concept, if extended to cover the Arab world, would mean the ultimate formation of a single country reaching from the borders of Egypt to the Persian Gulf. It is true that the UAR has momentarily left room for the federal idea. Yemen, unwilling to lose its identity, affiliated with the UAR to form the United Arab States (UAS), which other states are invited to join. Most observers, however, feel that this is only a matter of tactics and that the pattern of a unified state is the true goal of the unity movement represented by the UAR.

The Old and the New

But the choice between the UAR and the AF also involves a major foreign policy decision. The UAR stands for "positive neutrality," the policy Nasser formulated for Egypt. This means granting at least an equal, if not preponderant, place to Soviet-bloc relations in counterbalance to and competition with the West and accepting the heritage of Nasser's badly strained relations with the Western powers. By contrast, to join the AF is to be in alliance with the one strongly pro-Western state in the Arab world, tied to the West through the Baghdad pact, which is considered to be a "defensive instrument against communism," and to shun Russian influence as far as possible.

Even more basic than these differences is the fact that the UAR and the AF typify new and old social developments, respectively. In many respects, the UAR is the expansion of the Egyptian revolution with its plans for a new political, economic and social system. Although Nasser has announced that the "integration" of the Syrian economy will take place slowly over a period of five years, the direction of the change is toward the kind of society that the Revolutionary Council is attempting to establish in Egypt. The AF, on the other hand, is a union of crowned heads and landlord parliaments that move more cautiously toward social change. The present government of Iraq is notable for its readiness to devote oil revenues to national development, but this is done within the framework of traditional constitutional monarchy and landlord leadership that many critics blame for the continuing plight of the common man.

There is no question but that the UAR revolutionary ideal is the future toward which many of the younger and more vigorous elements of the Arab world are looking today. This is one reason why Nasser is so popular and why his picture is enthusiastically displayed in Beirut and Baghdad, where the governments are distinctly anti-Nasser and pro-Western. In the turbulent, dissatisfied, socially awakening mind of the coming generation, Nasser stands for the kind of changes that must take place if the Arab world, as they see it, is to be reborn into the 20th century.

This is one reason why the Arab mergers have injected a new instability into an already unstable scene. Some governments will prefer the slower, more cautious path of gradually reshaping society while retaining the form and governments of the present states, but the growing middle class is attracted to the more dra-

matic and sweeping changes typified by the Egyptian revolution. Thus pressure to choose between the UAR and the AF may set governments against their own people—or at least involve them in serious internal tensions.

Arab Nationalism

A further implication of the mergers is that Arab nationalism now appears more basic and decisive for some parts of the Arab world than separate "national" nationalisms. It has often been argued that the creation of splinter states out of the Arab portion of the Ottoman Empire, as a result of the World War I peace settlements, effectively broke up pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism. Separate national life and deliberately cultivated patriotism for Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan were assumed to have established local centers of political consciousness that relegated the pan-Arab ideal to emotion and oratory.

Yet the alacrity with which Syria voted itself out of existence and Iraq and Jordan gave up their full national sovereignty showed that pan-Arab nationalism is still a basic and operative political loyalty. This is not so true for Egypt, which has had a conscious national life since the days of Mohammed Ali in the 1840's. There is considerable evidence that many Egyptians look on their union with Syria either as a form of Egyptian expansionism, or simply as a political maneuver. It is different in the Fertile Crescent countries. Here the genesis of political consciousness began with the Arab national struggle against the Turks. The patriotic loyalty to separate Arab countries only came later—and often as a second best.

It is significant that both the UAR and AF harked back to the same historic incident in announcing their

creation. This was the short-lived Arab kingdom of Emir Feisal in Damascus, which came into being at the end of World War I. Then there was no Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon or Syria, which were created as mandates for the Allied powers in dividing the spoils of the defeated Ottoman Empire. For nearly 40 years before 1914, there had been an Arab national movement with its center in Damascus and Beirut, devoted to winning some form of Arab autonomy within imperial Turkey. It was in fulfillment of this objective that the Arab revolt, typified by the glamorous Colonel Lawrence of Arabia, was undertaken. What the Arabs then fought for was not a series of splinter states, but some form of "Arab Kingdom" that would embrace most of the Fertile Crescent.

This means that the first awakening of Arab political consciousness in the modern world was in connection with the ideal of Arab unity. Only when that dream failed and a series of separate Arab states was created, did the "national" nationalisms that have been so important in recent years emerge. But the mergers remind us that the first love is not dead. While many other factors were involved in the formulation of the UAR and the AF, neither would have been possible without a substratum of attachment to the "Arab nation" which later nationalisms have not entirely smothered.

This is one important element of the current situation in Lebanon. Modern Lebanon was created as a French mandate after World War I. At that time the size of the original Turkish Sanjak of Lebanon (enclosing a Christian population pocket) was increased threefold to include Muslim areas which had been part of Turkish Syria. The Sanjak of Lebanon had been given a semi-autonomous status in 1864, when the Euro-

pean powers under French leadership undertook to protect the status of the Christian majority on the Syrian seacoast. The Christian Lebanese community therefore has a genuine political feeling for Lebanon as something which antedated the Arab revolt and the grant to France of a mandate over Syria.

But the Muslim group, included in Lebanon by the will of France for the purpose of weakening the political potential of Syria, has never forgotten its sense of attachment to the Arab cause. When Syria gives up its national life to join an Arab union, it is not surprising if the submerged Arab feeling of the Muslim group in Lebanon takes violent form to move their country toward the UAR. Doubtless influences from without have deliberately aggravated the situation, but the aggravation is made effective because there is already a cleavage within Lebanon between Lebanese nationalism and Arab nationalism.

New Opportunity for U.S.

A final implication of the mergers is that through them the United States is given an opportunity to review and revise its policies toward Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Technically these four countries no longer exist in full independence; there are two new states (UAR and AF) with which the United States must deal. While this may seem to be only a technical fiction, it is a fiction that will permit us to institute fresh policies, if this seems desirable.

Certainly in the case of Syria and Egypt, the United States policy of frigid isolation has not worked with marked success. Our theory that we could drive these nations into a corner has proved false, for the corner turned out to be a corridor running toward the Soviet bloc. This is not

to suggest that we now abandon our allies in Lebanon and Iraq in favor of the UAR. But it will be wise to take a realistic view of the situation and recognize that the UAR unity movement may well be the pattern of the future for the Arab world. If it is, the United States ought to be related to it in reasonable fashion, and the necessity of instituting fresh diplomatic relations with the UAR gives us an opportunity to do this.

For different reasons it is also well to review our relations with Jordan and Iraq. Here the problem is not so much political as economic. While the AF is pro-Western in policy, its greatest long-term problem is to bring about the national development that will not only meet the rising consciousness of the middle and lower classes but effectively demonstrate that the UAR is not the only Arab movement devoted to social betterment. Our foreign-aid program in Iraq has been only partially successful, and economic development in Jordan is constantly inhibited because the country has so few resources on which to build. By combining Iraq's skills, government administration and resources with Jordan's fairly successful technical assistance program, an impressive economic program might be carried out.

This is highly desirable, for there ought to be at least one place in the Arab world where we can demonstrate that partnership with the West is more than a matter of arms and military alliances. It must include what really lies at the heart of Arab discontent—the vision of a better and more generous life for awakening nations.

READING SUGGESTIONS: George Antonius, *Arab Awakening* (New York, Putnam, 1946); John Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East* (New York, Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958); Philip K. Hitti, *History of Syria* (New York, Macmillan, 1951) and *Lebanon in History* (New York, Macmillan, 1957).

Spotlight

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months? Will the familiar political party system be restored? Or will France move toward a form of corporative legislature under the aegis of a strengthened executive? And if it does, to what extent will its example affect other nations of Western Europe?

What is 'Integration'?

Second, the crisis which broke out in Algeria when the Pflimlin government came to power brought cries from the French *colons* for "integration"—of the population in the territory, which is already an integral part of metropolitan France. General de Gaulle, for his part, during his dramatic visit to Algeria on June 4-6, spoke of "equality" between the nine million Muslims and the one million Frenchmen, with a hint of a future federal relationship between Algeria and France.

It is not yet clear what integration may mean in practice, but if the goal is to put the Muslim majority on the same footing, politically, economically and socially, with the French minority, then France would be undertaking a task of far-reaching importance which has hitherto never been attempted by a Western nation ruling over non-Westerners. For if the Muslims of Algeria are to be

elected to the National Assembly in Paris, then they would control at least 125 votes out of 596 in a legislature which makes policies for over 45 million Frenchmen—and this figure could rise higher in the future due to the higher fertility of the Muslim population. France, moreover, would have to provide \$360 million to finance family allowances and social security payments to Muslims if it is to give them an economic and social status equal to that of the French; this figure does not include the cost of equalizing wages paid to Muslims, or of building new schools to provide equal educational facilities.

And, third, France under de Gaulle, whatever the details of the course he may follow in world affairs, can be expected to assert its independence. This it has already tried to do since the Suez crisis that brought home to the French, as no other post-1914 development had done, the extent to which their country had become dependent on the good graces of other nations—from the financial and military aid of the United States to Egypt's control of the Canal and, consequently, of the Middle East oil vital for France's modern industries.

The desire of the French to develop their own sources of atomic energy (and even their own nuclear bombs), the excitement (which some

observers regard as premature), generated by the discovery of oil in the Sahara, whose exploitation is contingent on cessation of the Algerian war—these have been symptoms of a new policy which may now assume increasing speed and significance. As Joseph Alsop, writing from Paris, has well said, in the past "France was always being cosseted by her allies, on the one hand, and always being taken for granted by her allies, on the other hand. A France in which de Gaulle has succeeded will not demand much cossetting. But such a France will not accept being taken for granted either."

If France becomes more independent, what will this mean for its neighbors and partners in the various schemes for Western European unity, particularly West Germany? Will Bonn try to stress that West Germany is a better and more reliable ally of the United States than France? And if so, will this tend to throw the French further into a new relationship with the U.S.S.R. than they now appear ready to go? The change in France, which had been long in the making but has now been crystallized by the return of de Gaulle, has set off new trends which may cause significant changes in Europe, as well as in Europe's relations with the United States.

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